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Introduction and summary
Since 1999, 13 countries have abandoned their national 
currency and joined the European Monetary Union, 
adopting the euro. This new currency regime posed 
unprecedented challenges in designing institutions 
that would ensure its success and stability. Particularly 
important to this endeavor was defining the interaction 
between fiscal policy and monetary policy. In the case 
of national currencies, large and persistent fiscal defi-
cits frequently lead to higher levels of inflation (Sargent 
and Wallace, 1981; and Sargent, 1986). This possibil-
ity became an even greater concern when many coun-
tries decided to share a single currency. Under the new 
regime, each country would fully reap any benefits of 
deficit spending but could potentially force others to 
face the undesirable consequences of undermining the 
independence of the newly created European Central 
Bank or generating instability in the Eurobond market 
(Chari and Kehoe, 2004). This concern was addressed 
in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, which paved the way 
for the monetary union, and especially in the European 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which was adopted 
in 1997. The pact made permanent some of the condi-
tions that the Maastricht Treaty required of entrants at 
the creation of the single currency. 
The cornerstone of the SGP is a cap of 3 percent 
on the ratio of general government deficit to gross do-
mestic product (GDP) that each country is allowed to 
run in any given year. In its original form, the pact set 
the cap to be independent of the mix of government 
spending (whether transfers, recurrent expenses, invest-
ment, or interest payments), and allowed for excep-
tions only in case of an unusual event outside  
of the state’s control or a severe recession.1
From the outset, many criticized the SGP as im-
posing a straightjacket on fiscal authorities. In this ar-
ticle, we address one specific criticism: the argument 
in favor of special treatment for public investment 
(Buiter, 2003; Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2004; and 
Monti, 2005). The argument starts from the premise 
that the fiscal authorities have a bias toward projects 
that yield immediate gains and postpone the costs. 
Therefore, applying the 3 percent cap to both invest-
ment and other expenses would lead governments to 
neglect their historical role as providers of major in-
frastructure (such as roads, airports, and schools) in 
favor of spending that yields more immediate but less 
long-lasting benefits (for example, social insurance  
or crime prevention). According to this view, appro-
priate incentives could be restored if some of the costs 
of public investment were postponed as well. This 
would require more borrowing to pay for public in-
vestment than to pay for other expenses. 
The notion that public investment ought to be 
treated differently from other government expenses is 
far from new. In fact, the prescription that the govern-
ment should only be allowed to borrow to pay for pub-
lic investment is known in public finance as the “golden 
rule.” Many national governments adopted this rule in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (see, for ex-
ample, the quotations in Bassetto with Sargent, 2005),2 
but the rule fell out of favor at the national level in 
the twentieth century, and very few countries adopt it 
nowadays (Germany being a notable exception). By 
contrast, this rule well approximates the behavior of 
most U.S. states: Almost all of the states’ constitutions 
provide for very strict borrowing limits, but many  34 3Q/2007, Economic Perspectives
allow significant borrowing for public investment 
(National Association of State Budget Officers, 2002). 
In recent years, many countries have struggled to 
meet the strict deficit cap imposed by the SGP. When 
the core countries of France and Germany failed to 
meet it in 2002, 2003, and 2004, it became clear that 
the pact was unenforceable, at least in its original form. 
As a result, the pact was reformed in 2005.3 This reform 
explicitly acknowledged the role of public investment 
as well as “policies to foster research and development 
and innovation” (European Council on the Stability 
and Growth Pact, 2005, article 1). Such expenses are 
cited as one of the factors that should be taken into 
account in evaluating whether a deficit is truly excessive. 
In this article, we analyze one rationale for the 
adoption of the golden rule: the conflict that arises 
among different generations when the current govern-
ment policy has the potential to provide both benefits 
(through investment) and costs (through borrowing) 
to future, unborn cohorts. Given the low rates of pop-
ulation growth, mobility, and mortality in European 
countries, we find that including or excluding public 
investment from the computation of the deficit ceiling 
has only moderate implications for the allocation cho-
sen by current generations. We also find that the dis-
tinction between excluding gross or net investment 
from the computation of the deficit is relevant. 
In the next section, we describe the model we use 
to analyze the efficiency of the government spending 
mix. This model is based upon a paper by Bassetto 
with Sargent (2006) that analyzed the same issue in the 
context of the U.S. federal and state governments. 
Then, we discuss the data that we use to calibrate the 
key parameters of the model, with particular attention 
to mobility. We present our main results and contrast 
the cases of the European countries with the findings 
in Bassetto with Sargent (2006) for the U.S. federal 
and state governments. 
Model
We describe here the salient features of the model, 
referring to Bassetto with Sargent (2006) for a com-
plete description. 
We consider a country populated by a large number 
of people of different ages. For simplicity, we abstract 
from the effects of demographic change, and we assume 
that the demographics of each country are in a steady 
state, characterized by a growth rate of the population 
n and a given distribution of the population by age.4
Each person can live at most N + 1 periods 
(years). Conditional on having survived until then, 
each household faces a probability 1 – θs of death in 
its sth period of life. 
People consume a private good and enjoy the 
services of two public goods, one nondurable (“gov-
ernment consumption”), the other durable (“govern-
ment capital”). By their nature, the same amounts of 
public goods are available to everyone, and nobody 
can be excluded from these services; hence, these 
goods cannot be paid by user fees, but must instead 
be produced from tax revenues. 
A household born in year t has preferences or-
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1 is the probabil-
ity of survival until age s – t, cs – t,s is consumption of 
the private good in period s by a person aged s – t (born 
in period t), f and v are strictly concave utility functions, 
Γs is the per capita stock of public capital in period s, 
and Gs is the amount of public consumption per capita 
in period s. 
Our analysis is greatly simplified by assuming that 
utility is linear in private consumption. This implies 
that a person’s wealth will not affect that individual’s 
relative preferences for private versus public consump-
tion, and allows us to focus on differences in their 
survival probabilities as the sole source of political con-
flict. This assumption is a useful approximation here be-
cause we are particularly interested in the decision of 
public consumption versus public investment, a mar-
gin that is less directly affected by differences in 
wealth.6
In each period, each person alive produces y units 
of output, which can be either consumed as a private 
good or turned into government consumption or in-
vestment.7 Public capital depreciates at a rate δ. The 
economy-wide resource constraint is thus
1)  Ct + Gt + γt  ≤  y, 
where Ct is private consumption per capita and γt is 
government gross investment per capita in period t.8
The country has a government that is empowered 
to levy taxes and produce public goods. Taxes and 
spending are chosen by majority vote each period, 
subject to exogenous restrictions on government in-
debtedness that are described by two parameters: 
n  d, a deficit ceiling (expressed in per capita 
terms), and 
n  x, a fraction of public investment that is not 
counted for the purposes of the deficit ceiling. 35 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
The government budget constraint in period t can 
thus be written as
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where Bt is government debt per capita at the end of 
period t, Tt are taxes per capita in period t, and r is the 
interest rate.9
In the original version of the SGP, d was equal to 
3 percent of GDP (y) and public investment was not 
excluded, so x = 0. While the 2005 reform does not 
explicitly exclude public investment, it does mention 
it as one of the factors that should be taken into account 
in assessing any breach of the 3 percent ceiling, sug-
gesting that x > 0 (if not equal to 1) under the current 
interpretation. 
Equation 3 assumes that the investment that can 
be excluded from the deficit computation is gross of 
capital depreciation. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2004), 
among others, recommend excluding net investment. 
In our numerical results, we establish the importance 
of this distinction. We thus also consider a version of 
























We assume that the government finances its op-
erations through lump-sum taxes levied equally on 
each person alive. We thus abstract from the distor-
tionary effects of taxation analyzed by Barro (1979) 
and Lucas and Stokey (1983), among many others. 
In each period, we assume that the households 
alive choose the level of public consumption, public 
investment, and taxes, subject to the deficit ceiling.  
In all of the numerical simulations that follow, the 
generations alive will unanimously support running 
the maximum allowable deficit, since this will shift 
the burden of taxation to future generations. This means 
that effectively the generations alive will vote on the 
amount of public consumption and investment, with 
the understanding that taxes will be set so as to hit the 
deficit ceiling exactly in each period. The actual experi-
ence of euro countries suggests that this result is less 
far-fetched than one would expect, since many of them 
have consistently stayed very close to the upper limit 
throughout the existence of the pact.10 If tax distortions 
were explicitly accounted for, countries would have 
an incentive to stay away from the ceiling in favor-
able periods, but this would not affect the main eco-
nomic forces analyzed here. 
Some general intuition
The environment described in the previous section 
delivers a particularly simple notion of the efficient 
size of the government, since all households alive share 
a common valuation of the public good. 
An efficient allocation of public goods (G*, Γ*) is 
given by the solution to the following two equations:11
4)  f ′(Gt) = 1, 
5)  v′(Γt) = 1 – β(1 – δ).
Consider equation 4 first. We chose units so that pro-
ducing one unit of public consumption per capita re-
quires sacrificing one unit per capita of the private 
good (see equation 1). The utility cost of the sacrifice 
is constant and equal to 1. Equation 4 states that in an 
efficient allocation, government spending should be 
set so that the benefit of an additional unit of public 
consumption is equal to its cost. 
Equation 5 looks at the case of government in-
vestment. The cost of an extra unit in terms of fore-
gone private consumption is again 1. The benefit is 
now twofold. First, the additional government capital 
yields immediate benefits, captured by v′(Γt). Second, 
government capital is durable, and 1 – δ units will 
survive into the next period; these units can be used 
to save on next year’s investment, thereby yielding a 
utility gain 1 – δ tomorrow. These gains are discount-
ed at the market discount factor, which in equilibrium 
is β = 1/(1 + r). 
Throughout this article, the equilibrium features 
unanimous support for the efficient provision of gov-
ernment consumption; that is, equation 4 will always 
hold. This happens because all generations alive 
agree on the benefits of this spending and they also 
share the costs equally. Furthermore, since there is 
unanimous agreement for setting taxes so that the 
deficit constraint d is binding, independent of the lev-
el of spending, extra spending must be matched by 
extra tax revenues to keep the deficit at d, and no 
costs can be passed to future generations (at the mar-
gin). The goal of this article is to discuss whether 
government consumption and government investment 
should be treated differently in the design of constitu-
tional deficit restrictions. For this reason, we rely on 
an environment that abstracts from all the potential 
distortions that could, in practice, lead to inefficiency 36 3Q/2007, Economic Perspectives
in static decisions (such as the provision of public 
consumption), and we concentrate instead on the con-
flict among different generations that arises when the 
government is called upon to make choices that have 
dynamic implications. 
To further illustrate the conflict among people of 
different ages over the provision of public investment, 
consider the simple case in which government invest-
ment cannot be excluded from the computation of the 
deficit, so that x = 0. In this case, an extra unit of pub-
lic investment generates in equilibrium the following 
costs and benefits: 
1.  The utility from consuming public capital in-
creases in period t by v′(Γt); 
2.  To pay for the investment, taxes increase in  
period t by 1; and 
3.  In period t + 1, additional (1 – δ)/(1 + n) units  
of capital per capita are available: This is smaller 
than 1 both because capital depreciates and be-
cause the same capital is spread over a larger 
population; the political equilibrium is such that 
investment will decrease by exactly (1 – δ)/(1 + n), 
so taxes decrease by this amount as well.12 
While the first two effects accrue to all generations 
alive equally, the last one will depend on the proba-
bility of being alive and present in the same country 
in period t + 1. A person of age s will support public 
investment up to the point at which
6 1
1
1 ) . ′( ) = −
+






Comparing equations 5 and 6, we see that they coin-
cide in the special case in which people are infinitely 
lived and immobile and there is no population growth. 
These conditions lead to what is known more generally 
as Ricardian equivalence—the principle of irrelevance 
of the debt and deficit policy.13 In this case, borrowing 
shifts costs into the future, but the same people will 
be alive and paying taxes into the future; thus, sooner 
or later, they will have to pay for the government 
spending. Since it will always be the same people 
who benefit from the public investment and pay the 
taxes, and those people agree in each period on costs 
and benefits, the case of Ricardian equivalence yields 
the efficient level of investment, independent of x. 
In general, we see that x = 0 always leads people 
to favor underinvestment.14 The magnitude of the un-
derinvestment is related to three factors:15
n  Population growth. The more new people are born 
(or immigrate), the more it is possible to shift 
costs to them by borrowing. This effect leads 
(alive) cohorts of all ages to discount future ben-
efits excessively. 
n  Survival probabilities. The smaller the probabili-
ty of surviving, the more people discount future 
benefits. Since the probability of dying in a given 
year is very small at most ages, this channel will 
not be as important except for the very old. 
n  Mobility. When people move from one country 
to another, they leave behind that country’s pub-
lic capital. At the same time, they stop paying 
that country’s taxes and thus leave behind debt  
as well.16 For the purpose of the model, moving 
to a different country is identical to dying in the 
first country and being “reborn” (at an age greater 
than 0) in the new one. Since the young are more 
mobile than the middle aged and the old, mobility 
will lead the young to discount future benefits and 
costs relatively more. As a consequence, when  
x = 0, the voting pattern will usually pit the rela-
tively impatient young and old against the rela-
tively patient middle aged. 
When some borrowing for public investment is 
allowed (x > 0), current investment bears consequenc-
es for more than two periods, and the preferences of 
each cohort depend on its entire prospects for mobili-
ty and survival over a longer period. In principle, this 
could generate very complicated patterns of voting by 
age. In practice, the simple intuition of the case with 
x = 0 carries over to the specific parameters of our 
numerical simulations. 
The big countries of the eurozone are characterized 
by very low population growth and low (international) 
mobility. These factors suggest that their demograph-
ics will be close to Ricardian equivalence; therefore, 
according special treatment to government invest-
ment in the SGP is unlikely to generate large efficien-
cy gains, as our numerical analysis confirms. 
Our previous discussion focused entirely on the 
parameter x, which measures the amount of public in-
vestment that is not counted in the computation of the 
deficit subject to the ceiling. The budget rule in equa-
tion 3 contains a second parameter, d, the maximal 
deficit level allowed. As it turns out, the deficit level 
has no effect on government efficiency in our model 
economy. The intuition for this result is straightforward. 
We already observed that current generations will set 
taxes so as to hit d exactly. Combining equations 2 
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Raising the ceiling is equivalent to a pure transfer of 
resources from future generations to the current ones: 
It allows current generations to cut their tax payments, 
leaving more debt to be repaid in the future. However, 
this does not affect the trade-offs that current genera-
tions face at the margin. As an example, consider the 
trade-off between taxes and public consumption. While 
the current generations can now afford lower taxes or 
higher public consumption, even under the new ceiling 
they still need to trade off one fewer dollar of taxes 
for one more dollar spent on the public good. This 
will lead them to choose Gt according to equation 4, 
exactly as before. A similar argument holds for gov-
ernment investment; while its level in general will  
not be efficient, it will not change with d. 
Efficiency wedge
Given a level of public capital Γt, we measure 
departures from efficiency by an efficiency wedge τ 
defined as follows:
τ =









Here, the wedge τ measures the percentage deviation 
of the value of the marginal public investment project 
from what it would be in the efficient allocation. As 
an example, if τ = 30 percent, it means that the gov-
ernment will only undertake projects whose benefits 
exceed $1.30 per $1 of cost.17 Hence, positive values  
of τ indicate underprovision, and negative values in-
dicate overprovision, of public capital. As discussed 
in Bassetto with Sargent (2006), we choose this measure 
because it is particularly robust to changes in assump-
tions on the preferences, and it does not require us to take 
a stand on the specific form of the utility function v. 
Data
We set a period in the model to be one year, in 
line with the budgeting cycle of all the countries con-
sidered here. The model has two parameters that we 
set the same for all countries: 
n  The agents’ discount factor. We set β to the most 
commonly used number of 0.96, which yields a 
yearly discount factor of approximately 4 percent. 
n  The depreciation rate of capital (δ). We use two 
values; we set it at 6 percent in line with common-
ly used estimates of the depreciation of private 
capital (we call this case “generic capital”), and 
we also experiment with the lower depreciation 
rate of 3 percent to capture investment in major 
infrastructure. 
For each country,18 we need four additional inputs: 
1.  The population growth rate; 
2.  The distribution by age of the population; 
3.  The mortality rate by age; and 
4.  The gross mobility out of the country by age,  
that is, the probability that a person of a given  
age will emigrate to a different country within  
the next year. 
A slight complication lies in the distinction be-
tween a country’s taxpayers and its citizens. The growth 
rate of the population matters for tax receipts, and is 
thus related to taxpayers (a population that would in-
clude noncitizens), while the other variables enter into 
the model because they affect the distribution of voters 
(only citizens). 
Our baseline calibration is based on data from 
the Statistical Office of the European Communities. 
Unfortunately, we do not have data on the number of 
citizens and the number of emigrant citizens (those 
who move to other countries) by age for the same year. 
We thus rely on data for the total population of the 
country. This is not a quantitatively important issue.19
As pointed out by the Statistical Office of the  
European Communities (2002), “frontier and immi-
gration controls are often minimal or non-existent for 
persons leaving a country, and there is a tendency for 
persons to remain recorded in administrative systems 
even after they have left the country.”20 It is thus like-
ly that these data are somewhat underestimated, which 
is why we use an alternative source for a robustness 
check. The extent of the underestimation is mitigated 
by the fact that the data include people that move 
only temporarily. This is especially common among 
the young. When a person plans to reenter the country 
within a short time (such as a couple of years), she 
will reap most of the benefits of public investment cur-
rently undertaken and will be responsible for paying 
most of the taxes to cover currently issued debt, so she 
should not be counted for our purposes. Our emigra-
tion rates are also significantly higher than those re-
ported by the Commission of the European Communities 
(2002, annex II), which states that only 0.1 percent of 
the European Union (EU) population moves from one 
country to another in any given year.21 This further 
reassures us that we are not relying on grossly under-
stated emigration rates. 
To check for robustness, we use the 2005 Euro-
barometer survey (Papacostas, 2007) as an alternative. 
The survey covers a representative sample of EU res-
idents aged 15 and above. One of the questions in the 38 3Q/2007, Economic Perspectives
TaBlE 1
Descriptive statistics
     Emigration rate
Region	 	  Baseline   Eurobarometer
	 (	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	percent	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	)
Austria		 0.5		 0.9		 0.5
Belgium		 0.4		 0.4		 0.7
Finland		 0.5		 0.2		 1.0
France		 0.7		 n.a.	 1.0
Germany		 0.3		 0.8		 0.5
Greece		 1.0		 n.a.	 0.6
Ireland		 2.1		 n.a.	 1.5
Italy		 0.4		 0.1		 0.6
Luxembourg		 1.1		 2.6		 0.7
Netherlands		 0.5		 0.5		 0.9
Portugal		 0.9		 n.a.	 0.8
Spain		 1.4		 0.2		 0.5
Median	of	the	










survey asks whether the interviewee is 
likely to move to a different country within 
the next five years.22 The survey also con-
tains information about citizenship, so we 
can restrict our sample to citizens residing 
in their home country. To strive for an up-
per bound, we assume that anyone that an-
swers yes will move, even though some 
express intent to move both within the 
country and abroad; we attribute one-fifth 
of this fraction to mobility in each given 
year (to account for the five-year window). 
This measure yields larger numbers for 
most countries.23
Table 1 presents summary statistics 
about population growth and mobility rates 
(averaged across all age groups). For com-
parison with Bassetto with Sargent (2006), 
we also include some U.S. data. This table 
shows that emigration rates from European 
countries are higher than those for the whole 
of the U.S., but much lower than they are 
for individual U.S. states. Population 
growth also tends to be lower in Europe.24
Numerical results
Table 2 shows our numerical results for the  
baseline calibration. We also include the values that 
apply to the U.S. federal government, to the median 
of the U.S. states, and to the state of Illinois.25
First, we consider what happens under a strict in-
terpretation of the SGP, which does not allow exclusion 
of public investment. With the exception of Luxembourg, 
the magnitude of the distortion is limited. In the worst-
case scenario, the predicted benefit of the marginal 
public investment in Austria and Spain is $1.24 for  
$1 in costs. Comparing the magnitude of the predicted 
wedge across countries, we confirm that it is bigger 
for countries with higher population growth (such as 
Spain) or higher emigration rates (Luxembourg and 
Austria), whereas it looks particularly small for Italy, 
a country with very low population growth and mo-
bility. Most of the variation across countries is driven 
by aggregate forces that shift up and down the incen-
tives of all generations at the same time; a much less 
prominent role is played by differences in the nature 
of the conflict among generations, stemming from a 
different age structure or a differential mobility by age. 
The efficiency wedges are somewhat similar to those 
predicted for the U.S. federal government. The simi-
larity comes from two forces that roughly compensate 
each other. First, lower population growth in Europe 
relative to the U.S. decreases the distortion that is 
coming from the anticipation of lower future per cap-
ita taxes with higher population growth. Second, small 
but nonetheless somewhat higher emigration from the 
European countries than from the U.S. increases the 
wedge, as voters discount the future more heavily. 
Table 2 also shows that the magnitude of distortions 
is much bigger in the case of individual U.S. states. 
This happens because the migration across U.S. states 
is significantly higher than across European countries. 
The case for treating public investment differently is 
thus much stronger at the U.S. state level (where this 
is standard practice) than at the European national level. 
A second important observation arises from look-
ing at the effect of excluding gross investment from 
the computation of the deficit. The distortions in this 
case are mostly as large as or larger than those in the 
original interpretation of the SGP, albeit in the oppo-
site direction: Countries are encouraged to significantly 
overspend, particularly when borrowing is allowed for 
investments that are not as long-lived, such as equip-
ment. This result stands in stark contrast to Bassetto 
with Sargent (2006), who find that the golden rule 
achieves a desirable allocation. The key difference is 
the repayment schedule of debt. In Bassetto with Sargent 
(2006), states are required to repay a fraction of the 
debt each period. This is meant to capture the practice 
of U.S. states, where debt issued to pay for capital im-
provements is gradually repaid and not rolled over in-
definitely. The SGP does not contain a provision that 39 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
TaBlE 2
Efficiency wedge τ in the baseline calibration
  SGP,  Excluding  Excluding
   no  gross   net
Region  exclusions  investment   investment
	 (	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	percent	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	)
    Generic capital
Austria		 16		 –24		 –1.8
Belgium		 11		 –22		 –1.2
Finland		 10		 –22		 –1.1
Germany		 14		 –23		 –1.5
Italy		 6		 –20		 –0.7
Luxembourg		 35		 –34		 –3.8
Netherlands		 13		 –22		 –1.4
Spain		 16		 –25		 –1.7
Median	of	the	countries	above		 14		 –22		 –1.5
Median	of	U.S.	states		 33		 –32		 –3.5
United	States		 14		 –24		 –1.5
Illinois		 30		 –30		 –3.2
  Major infrastructure
Austria		 24		 –17		 –1.8
Belgium		 16		 –16		 –1.2
Finland		 15		 –16		 –1.1
Germany		 21		 –16		 –1.5
Italy		 9		 –14		 –0.7
Luxembourg		 51		 –25		 –3.8
Netherlands		 19		 –16		 –1.4
Spain		 24		 –18		 –1.7
Median	of	the	countries	above		 20		 –16		 –1.5
Median	of	U.S.	states		 48		 –24		 –3.5
United	States		 20		 –18		 –1.5





ensures such gradual repayment; from 
equation 7, we see that the government is 
only raising taxes to repay interest on its 
past debt and it is rolling over the princi-
pal.26 This strategy moves costs too far into 
the future compared with the dates at 
which the bulk of the benefits of invest-
ment will be reaped; hence, current genera-
tions will be tempted to overspend. One 
possible solution is to set x < 1, that is, to 
allow only a portion of investment to be 
excluded from the deficit computation.  
Alternatively, excluding net investment 
from the deficit subject to the ceiling per-
forms really well. Table 2 shows that the 
value of the marginal investment is very 
close to efficiency in this case, supporting 
Blanchard and Giavazzi’s (2004) recom-
mendation. Excluding net investment is 
equivalent to setting a schedule to repay 
the debt that is used in financing invest-
ment. To see why, consider what happens if 
people raise public investment by $1 in pe-
riod t and do not change gross investment 
in the future. In period t, the government is 
allowed to issue an extra dollar of debt. In 
period t + 1, government capital is now 
higher, and the same level of gross invest-
ment as before leads to a smaller net in-
vestment, by δ/(1 + n) dollars per capita; 
this in turn forces the government to reduce 
its deficit in period t + 1 by the same 
amount, which contributes to reducing the 
debt contracted at period t. A similar pro-
cess would continue in all subsequent periods, since 
public capital would only gradually converge back to 
the level that would prevail without the extra dollar 
of investment.27 In practice, excluding net investment 
is significantly more complicated than excluding 
gross investment, since it requires knowledge of the 
appropriate depreciation rate of public capital. Each 
additional complication generates new opportunities 
for governments to game the accounting,28 and such  
a complication is only justified when the magnitude 
of the distortions involved is sufficiently large. 
For figure 1, we have chosen Germany as an ex-
ample to illustrate how the political decision emerges 
from the conflict across different generations alive in 
the case of generic capital. The figure plots the wedge 
τ that would be preferred by each cohort; a larger (more 
positive) τ means that the cohort favors more severe 
underinvestment, whereas a more negative τ implies 
that the cohort favors more severe overinvestment.  
In figure 1, the median voter line indicates the policy 
that is chosen under majority voting: Exactly 50 per-
cent of the voters would prefer larger overprovision 
(or smaller underprovision) and 50 percent smaller 
overprovision (or larger underprovision). We can  
see that all people alive unanimously support under-
investment if no exclusion is allowed (x = 0) and 
overinvestment when gross investment is excluded 
from the deficit ceiling. When net investment is ex-
cluded, most generations favor an allocation that is 
extremely close to efficient. In two of the three cases 
(panels A and C of figure 1), the vote pits the young 
and old against the middle aged, as we remarked ear-
lier. In the case of excluding gross investment, the 
prospect of pushing taxes further into the future  
becomes particularly relevant, and a different split 
emerges, with the young on the patient side against 
the old on the impatient side (see panel B of figure 1). 40 3Q/2007, Economic Perspectives
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A. SGP, generic capital, no exclusions from deficit count
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Notes: SGP means European Stability and Growth Pact. The median voter line  
indicates the policy that is chosen under majority voting: Exactly 50 percent of  
the voters would prefer larger overprovision (or smaller underprovision) and  
50 percent smaller overprovision (or larger underprovision). See the text for  
further details on the efficiency wedge τ.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Statistical Office of the  
European Communities.
Table 3 shows the results when emi-
gration is calibrated to the intentions re-
vealed in the Eurobarometer survey.29  
For the large countries with low popula-
tion growth and mobility, notably Germany 
and Italy, the results are similar to those 
of the baseline calibration. The distortion 
arising from treating government con-
sumption and investment in the same way 
(that is, no exclusions) is not very large, 
albeit not entirely trivial. Distortions are 
bigger in the case of some of the smaller 
countries, although the same countries 
are likely to suffer from more upward 
bias from temporary mobility. This is  
particularly the case for Ireland, where  
16 percent of the citizens currently resid-
ing in Ireland report having lived abroad 
in the past. 
Conclusion
Two main conclusions stand out 
from the analysis we carried out.
n  The demographics and mobility rates 
for European countries do not justify 
drawing a sharp distinction between the 
financing of government consumption 
and investment in the same way those 
factors for the U.S. states do. 
n  To the extent that a distinction is ap-
proved, it is important to exclude 
only net investment from the deficit 
count, since excluding gross invest-
ment could actually worsen distortions. 
We analyzed the efficiency implica-
tions of the SGP from the perspective of 
an individual country. For this article, it 
does not matter whether the deficit restric-
tions follow from a multilateral agreement, 
such as the SGP, or are self-imposed by 
the constitutions of individual entities, as 
is the case for U.S. states. Many authors 
have discussed the externalities that justi-
fy the adoption of a multilateral pact that 
covers fiscal policy in a monetary union; 
among them are Beetsma and Uhlig (1999), 
Dixit and Lambertini (2001), Chari and 
Kehoe (2004), and Lindbeck and Niepelt 
(2004). Their insights provide conditions 
under which it is desirable to restrict the 
independence of an individual government 
in running its fiscal affairs, but they do 
not bear implications for setting common 41 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
TaBlE 3
Efficiency wedge τ in the Eurobarometer calibration
  SGP,  Excluding  Excluding
   no  gross   net
Country  exclusions  investment   investment
	 (	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	percent	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	)
    Generic capital
Austria		 12		 –22		 –1.3
Belgium		 14		 –23		 –1.6
Finland		 21		 –24		 –2.2
France		 17		 –25		 –1.9
Germany		 14		 –22		 –1.5
Greece		 19		 –24		 –2.1
Ireland		 34		 –32		 –3.6
Italy		 13		 –23		 –1.4
Luxembourg		 19		 –25		 –2.1
Netherlands		 18		 –24		 –1.9
Portugal		 21		 –26		 –2.3
Spain		 21		 –25		 –2.3
    Major infrastructure
Austria		 17		 –16		 –1.3
Belgium		 21	 	–17		 –1.6
Finland		 30		 –18		 –2.2
France		 25		 –18		 –1.9
Germany		 21		 –16		 –1.5
Greece		 28		 –18		 –2.1
Ireland		 49		 –24		 –3.6
Italy		 20		 –16		 –1.4
Luxembourg		 28		 –18		 –2.1
Netherlands		 26		 –18		 –1.9
Portugal		 31		 –19		 –2.3





or different rules for government consump-
tion and investment. 
Our model captures some forces that 
lead voters to discount future costs and 
benefits excessively, but it does not enter-
tain the possibility that elected politicians 
may act as if they were even more short-
sighted than voters. Some of these alter-
natives are briefly discussed in Bassetto 
with Sargent (2006); while it is easy to 
generate reasons why the current govern-
ment might be tempted to overspend if 
deficit restrictions are not imposed, it is 
harder to devise environments where 
overspending would affect public con-
sumption more than investment, at least 
without appealing to myopic behavior on 
the part of the voters. 
1The pact defines an economic downturn as severe if there is an  
annual fall of real GDP of at least 2 percent.
2Most of the early provisions distinguished between “extraordinary” 
and “ordinary” expenses, rather than between public improvements 
and other expenses. This distinction is relevant, since the largest 
extraordinary expenses were wars, rather than major infrastructures.
3This reform is widely considered to have significantly watered 
down the pact (see, for example, Calmfors, 2005) by giving leeway 
to postpone sanctions under a wide array of attenuating circumstances.
4The model could be solved by taking into account demographic 
changes as well, but the results would not be affected significantly.
5We adopt the convention  θ j J=




6Simulations with more general preferences are discussed in the 
appendix of Bassetto with Sargent (2006).
7Private capital and a more complete description of production 
could be introduced with no effect on the results.
8We thus have γt = Γt – (1 – δ)Γt–1 /(1 + n).
9In equilibrium, if a market for annuities exists, as we assume,  
r = (1 – β)/β.
10In principle, the SGP provides that countries should strive for a 
budget “close to balance or in surplus” over the medium term 
(European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact, 1997). However, 
this provision is effectively not enforced.
11For a formal derivation, see Bassetto with Sargent (2006).
12For a proof, see Bassetto with Sargent (2006).
13Barro (1974) explains that the result survives if people are part of 
dynasties where different generations are connected by altruism and 
intergenerational transfers. We assume this is not the case, although 
in our environment, international mobility would generate a sepa-
rate channel that breaks down Ricardian equivalence.
14This is true as long as the population is not shrinking.
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15As pointed out by Weil (1989), the main driver behind all three 
factors is the influx of new people into the economy. As an example, 
for a given level of population growth, higher mortality also im-
plies that more people must either be born or immigrate. Nonetheless, 
distinguishing between the influx of people and mortality/emigra-
tion is important when considering the conflict among different co-
horts that are alive at the same time: The old will discount future 
benefits much more heavily than the young because they have a 
lower probability of survival.
16Even in countries that tax their citizens on income earned world-
wide regardless of residence (for example, the U.S.), a credit for 
taxes paid to foreign governments is allowed, so that in many in-
stances no tax is due.
17The cost is measured netting out the undepreciated value left for 
the subsequent period.
18We consider the 12 countries that were part of the eurozone as of 
2006. Those countries were Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, the Republic of Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.
19We use the average annual population growth rate between 1995 
and 2005. We use the latest available year for emigration rates: This 
is 2005 except for Belgium (1999) and Italy (2003). The popula-
tion distribution by age is for the same year. We do not have data 
for four of the countries. We use piecewise linear interpolation of 
five-year aggregated migration numbers to obtain the emigration 
rate for each year of age. We thank Anna Lööf for assistance in  
getting more updated data than those in the Statistical Office of the 
European Communities (2002); this also allowed us to include 
Germany and Spain. All of these statistics are computed on the 
population aged 18–90.
20If immigration data were reliably estimated, we could use data 
about changes in population combined with data on deaths and im-
migration to infer emigration. However, this procedure yields neg-
ative numbers in several cases, presumably because immigration is 
underestimated as well.
21Martí and Ródenas (2007) discuss why this number is severely 
underestimated.
22Specifically, the question asks: “Do you think that in the next five 
years you are likely to move ... ?” The possible answers are:  
1. In the same city/town/village; 2. To another city/town/village  
but in the same region; 3. To another region but in the same coun-
try; 4. To another country in the European Union; 5. To another 
country outside the European Union; 6. You don’t think you will 
move; and 7. Don’t know. Interviewees are allowed multiple re-
sponses, and we sum up all people that include options 4 or 5, ac-
cording to their population weights.
23A notable exception is Luxembourg, where the discrepancy be-
tween citizens and other nationals plays an important role.
24U.S. data are from the 2000 U.S. Census; for details, see Bassetto 
with Sargent (2006).
25Details of the calibration are contained in Bassetto with Sargent 
(2006). Note that the federal data used do not take into account 
emigration from the U.S., so that the magnitude of the distortions 
is very slightly understated (emigration from the U.S. is exceeding-
ly small).
26The SGP also contains a separate provision stating that the debt-
to-GDP ratio of a country should be below 60 percent or moving 
toward that goal. This provision is weakly enforced, and it would 
also not be sufficient to generate the repayment schedule that is 
needed for distortions to vanish.
27While intuition is simpler when thinking that gross investment is 
changed only once, the political–economic equilibrium of this 
economy would imply that any additional investment in period t 
would be reversed in period t + 1. Although this modifies the exact 
sequence of tax changes over time, it yields a similar intuition. When 
net investment is excluded from the deficit count, in equilibrium 
the wedge is given by the simple expression median(qs)/(1 + n) – 1, 
which is independent of the depreciation rate of capital. This is  
apparent in tables 2 and 3.
28See also the discussion in Balassone and Franco (2000).
29For the countries for which we had no data on emigration rates 
from the Statistical Office of the European Communities, we use 
the population structure by age as of 2005, with the exception of 
France (as of 2004).
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